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NEW YORK’S APPROACH TO FAULTY 
WORK AND THE TERM “OCCURRENCE” 
IN COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY 
INSURANCE POLICIES 
RICHARD M. HAUSER JR.† 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following scenario: A large power plant hires a 
global construction firm to produce eight reactors designed to 
remove toxic pollutants from exhaust that the plant releases into 
the atmosphere.  The reactors are large and extremely complicat-
ed pieces of machinery, so the construction company subcontracts 
the manufacturing and installation of their internal components 
to multiple different subcontractors.  Shortly after the power 
plant puts three of the reactors into operation, plant supervisors 
discover cracking and fracturing in the reactors caused by a 
defect in an internal gas riser manufactured by a subcontractor.  
The damage to those reactors is so severe that they must be 
completely replaced.  And while the plant has not begun operat-
ing the other five reactors, the construction company already 
installed the same faulty gas riser in them.  Workers cannot re-
place the faulty gas risers in the tight confines of the reactors 
without damaging them.   
The construction company incurs over $200 million in costs 
repairing the reactors for the power plant.  Luckily, they procured 
commercial general liability (“CGL”) insurance to cover their 
work on the reactors before they began the project.  A payout 
within the limits of the policy would indemnify them for a great 
deal of the repair costs.  But the insurance company refuses to 
pay, claiming that the damage to the reactors is not covered 
under the CGL policy.  First, they insist that the damage to the 
reactors is not a coverable occurrence as defined in the policy 
because it was caused by the subcontractor’s faulty work, and 
faulty work is foreseeable.  Second, they argue that even if it was 
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an “occurrence,” the damage is not coverable under the policy 
because it occurred to the work that was the subject of the 
construction contract and not to the property of a third party as 
defined in the policy.   
This exact factual scenario is the subject of Black & Veatch 
Corp. v. Aspen Insurance (U.K.) Ltd.1  There, the Tenth Circuit 
held that under New York law, faulty subcontractor work can be 
a coverable occurrence under a standard form CGL policy, and 
the faulty gas riser installation at issue was such an occurrence.2  
The court also found that the damage to the reactors was 
property damage as defined in the CGL policy, and therefore the 
company was entitled to indemnification for the cost of repairing 
that damage.3  If this decision is indicative of how the New York 
Court of Appeals would rule, then New York will join the 
“overwhelming trend” of state supreme courts that recognize 
faulty work as an occurrence.4   
CGL coverage for faulty subcontractor work is important for 
two reasons.  First, denying contractors indemnification for dam-
ages caused by faulty subcontractor work would force them to 
“ha[ve] a supervisor at the elbow of each subcontractor at all 
times,” which would be “prohibitively expensive” unless they 
passed that cost onto their customers.5  Second, unsophisticated 
consumers may expect the CGL policies they purchase with 
hard-earned money to cover faulty work by their subcontractors, 
only to get burned when that very contingency occurs.  While a 
multinational engineering firm like Black & Veatch may have in-
house counsel to peruse insurance contracts, the neighborhood 
contractor has neither the sophistication nor the bargaining pow-
er to negotiate for provisions in the insurer’s form contract. 
Even if faulty work is considered a coverable occurrence, yet 
another issue arises: Should that coverage include indemnifica-
tion for the cost of repairing and replacing the faulty work itself, 
or merely for damage to other property caused by that faulty 
work?  The court in Black & Veatch Corp. did not have occasion 
to answer this question because the policy at issue defined cov-
 
1 882 F.3d 952, 954–56 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 151 (2018). 
2 Id. at 971. 
3 Id. at 963–64. 
4 Id. at 971.  
5 U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 890 (Fla. 2007) (quoting 2 
JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 14.13[D], at 14-224.8 
(3d ed. Supp. 2007)).  
2020] NEW YORK’S APPROACH TO FAULTY WORK 305 
erable property damage as damage to the property of a third 
party.6  The court concluded that the reactors belonged to the 
power plant, which was a third party under the terms of the 
policy.7  Therefore, all of the damage was coverable under the 
policy, including the cost of repairing and replacing the reactors 
that had been assembled with the faulty gas risers but had not 
yet been put into operation.8  Nonetheless, this question is an im-
portant one because contractors who expect to be indemnified for 
damage caused to other property by faulty subcontractor work 
may also expect to be indemnified for the cost of repairing and 
replacing the faulty work itself, since both result from the ac-
cidental error of a subcontractor.  While a majority of states rec-
ognize faulty work as an occurrence, only a handful of those 
states consider the cost of repairing and replacing the faulty 
work itself to be coverable property damage under standard form 
CGL policies.9   
In October of 2018, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that 
faulty subcontractor work was not a coverable occurrence under 
standard form CGL policies in an extraordinary “spurning”10 of 
the national trend.11  As this Note discusses below, the Supreme 
Court of Ohio’s holding was based on precedent that applied a 
flawed understanding of CGL policies to the issue of faulty work.  
Fortunately, the New York Court of Appeals is not bound by 
similar precedent.12   
In the face of urgency created by the Supreme Court of 
Ohio’s decision, this Note argues that the New York Court of Ap-
peals should hold that faulty work is a coverable occurrence 
under standard form CGL policies, and the cost of repairing and 
replacing the faulty work itself is coverable “property damage.”  
Part I of this Note defines standard form CGL policy language, 
such as “occurrence,” “property damage,” and “accident.”  Part I 
also explores relevant exclusions that limit coverage and the 
 
6 Id. 
7 Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 963–64. 
8 See id. 
9 See Christopher C. French, Revisiting Construction Defects as “Occurrences” 
Under CGL Insurance Policies, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 101, 126, 128–29 (2016). 
10 Jeff Sistrunk, Ohio Justices Say Bad Subcontractor Work Not an “Accident,” 
LAW360 (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1090223 [https://perma.cc/ 
VXD5-XVZD]. 
11 Ohio N. Univ. v. Charles Constr. Servs., Inc., 155 Ohio St. 3d 197, 2018-Ohio-
4057, 120 N.E.3d 762, at ¶ 3. 
12 See infra Part II. 
306 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:303   
exceptions to those exclusions.  Part II discusses New York law 
with respect to CGL policies, starting with a brief analysis of the 
doctrines of policy interpretation, followed by an analysis of the 
leading New York intermediate appellate court case, which holds 
that faulty work is not an occurrence.  Part II then contrasts that 
case with the Black & Veatch Corp. holding.   
Part III discusses a scholarly approach to CGL policy inter-
pretation referenced by the court in Black & Veatch Corp.  The 
thesis is that faulty work should always be considered an 
occurrence unless it is subjectively expected or intended by the 
insured.  Part III then discusses cases from other states’ highest 
courts that apply a similar subjective standard and contrasts 
those cases with the Supreme Court of Ohio’s recent decision in 
Ohio Northern University, which applied a more objective stan-
dard.  Part IV discusses an issue not raised in Black & Veatch 
Corp.—namely, whether the cost of repairing and replacing the 
faulty work itself is coverable property damage under standard 
form CGL policies.   
Finally, Part V makes the case that the New York Court of 
Appeals should hold that faulty subcontractor work is a coverable 
occurrence under standard form CGL policies.  First, Part V con-
cludes that the Black & Veatch Corp. court correctly distinguished 
the leading New York intermediate appellate court case based on 
its facts and a major difference in the CGL policy at issue.  Sec-
ond, Part V argues that the New York Court of Appeals should 
adopt a subjective standard rather than an objective standard 
like the one applied by the Supreme Court of Ohio.  Last, Part V 
contends that the New York Court of Appeals should also hold 
that the cost of repairing and replacing the faulty work itself is 
included in the definition of coverable “property damage” under 
standard form CGL policies. 
I.  STANDARD FORM CGL POLICY LANGUAGE  
The standard form CGL policy issued by the Insurance Ser-
vices Office (“ISO”)13 since 201314 employs a three-part structure: 
 
13 The Insurance Services Office is the primary developer of standard CGL poli-
cy forms for state insurance regulators in the United States. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 
v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772 (1993) (“[The] ISO develops standard policy forms 
and files or lodges them with each State’s insurance regulators; most CGL insurance 
written in the United States is written on these forms.”). The standard form policy 
can then be tailored to the needs of the insurer or insured by way of “endorsements” 
that amend the policy language. Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 958 (“[The] ISO 
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(a) the basic insuring agreement determines initial coverage, (b) the 
various exclusions narrow the scope of coverage, and (c) the vari-
ous exceptions to those exclusions restore coverage.15 
A. Initial Coverage Under CGL Policies and Definitions of 
Relevant Policy Language 
The standard form policy provides the following basic insur-
ing agreement language:  
SECTION I—COVERAGES 
 
COVERAGE A—BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE 
LIABILITY 
 
1. Insuring Agreement 
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legal-
ly obligated to pay as damages because of . . . “property 
damage” to which this insurance applies. . . .  
b. This insurance applies to . . .“property damage” only if: 
(1) The . . . “property damage” is caused by an “occur-
rence” that takes place in the “coverage ter-
ritory” . . . .16 
Under the basic agreement, “the insurer agrees to pay those 
sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as dam-
ages because of . . . property damage . . . caused by an occurrence 
that takes place in the coverage territory.”17  This essentially im-
poses a dual requirement for coverage.  There must be: (1) property 
damage, and (2) an occurrence. 
 
maintains a large portfolio of ‘endorsements,’ language that can be used to amend a 
standard CGL policy to suit the needs of the insured or insurer” (citation omitted)).  
14 The ISO has instituted several major revisions in the standard form CGL 
policies it has issued since 1940. Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 959–60. The 
most recent was in 2013. See Laurie Infantino, ISO Form Changes Commercial 
General Liability, INSURANCE THOUGHT LEADERSHIP (Mar. 19, 2013), 
https://www.insurancethoughtleadership.com/iso-form-changes-commercial-general-
liability/ [https://perma.cc/EBM3-YZNV]. This Note discusses the most relevant 
changes for faulty work jurisprudence. See infra Section I.B. 
15 Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 958 (“The basic insuring agreement is then 
subject to exclusions, which narrow the scope of coverage. The exclusions are then 
subject to exceptions, which restore coverage—but only to the extent coverage was 
initially included in the basic insuring agreement.”). 
16 Ins. Servs. Off., Inc., Form No. CG 00 02 04 13, Commercial General Liability 
Coverage Form (2013) [hereinafter Coverage Form (2013)], reprinted in DONALD S. 
MALECKI ET AL., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE GUIDE 549, 549 (12th 
ed. 2017). 
17 MALECKI ET AL., supra note 16, at 1. 
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There are two kinds of “property damage.”  The first is 
“[p]hysical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss 
of use of that property.”18  For this kind of property damage, “[a]ll 
such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the 
physical injury that caused it.”19  The second is “[l]oss of use of 
tangible property that is not physically injured.”20  For the second 
kind of property damage, “[a]ll such loss of use shall be deemed 
to occur at the time of the ‘occurrence’ that caused it.”21  Notably, 
neither kind distinguishes between tangible property that is the 
subject of the insured’s own work and tangible property that is 
owned by a third party—both simply encompass tangible prop-
erty.22  Moreover, both kinds encompass loss of use of tangible 
property, differentiated by its cause; the former covers loss of use 
caused by physical injury, while the latter covers loss of use that 
is simply caused by an “occurrence.”   
An “[o]ccurrence,” the second requirement for coverage, is 
defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated expo-
sure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.”23  
Modern standard form CGL policies do not define the term acci-
dent, but exclude “ ‘[b]odily injury’ or ‘property damage’ expected 
or intended from the standpoint of the insured” from coverage.24  
 




22 See French, supra note 9, at 105 (“Notably, the definition does not make a 
distinction between property that is created by the contractor/policyholder (i.e., the 
contractor’s workmanship) and separate property owned by a third party . . . .”). 
23 Coverage Form (2013), supra note 16, at 564. 
24 Id. at 549. The definition of “occurrence” in modern CGL forms differs from 
the definition given in the 1973 ISO form, which defined “occurrence” as “an ac-
cident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in 
bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint 
of the insured.” Ins. Servs. Off., Inc., Form No. GL 00 02 01 73, Comprehensive 
General Liability Insurance Coverage Form (1973) [hereinafter Coverage Form 
(1973)], reprinted in MALECKI ET AL., supra note 16, at 489 (emphasis added); see 
also French, supra note 9, at 105-06. The “expected or intended” language was 
moved to the exclusions section in the ISO’s 1986 policy revision, but the change was 
not intended to affect the requirement that an “occurrence” must be fortuitous. 
MALECKI ET AL., supra note 16, at 7 (“Despite the change in the wording of the 
occurrence definition, the effect is intended to be the same as in the 1973 policy. 
Thus, whether it can be said that bodily injury or property damage is caused by an 
occurrence still hinges on fortuity.”). The “continuous or repeated exposure” lan-
guage means that the definition of occurrence is not limited to a single event but 
encompasses gradual exposure. Id. at 404 (“[T]he phrase ‘continuous or repeated 
exposure’ eliminates the necessity of proving the exact moment at which damage is 
sustained.”). 
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The effect of this language is to provide coverage for “property 
damage” the insured did not expect or intend to be caused by 
their actions, whether their actions alone were intentional or not.  
B. The Business Risk Exclusions from Coverage Under CGL 
Policies 
The initial coverage provided under the basic insuring 
agreement is then limited by several exclusions.  Traditionally, 
insurers do not cover “business risk[s],” such as liability for the 
insured’s breach of implied or express contractual warranties 
that the insured’s work will be performed according to particular 
specifications.25  Numerous kinds of business risks are excluded 
from coverage under standard form CGL policies.26  The most 
relevant exclusion in the contracting context is “Exclusion L,” or 
the “Your Work”27 exclusion, which provides that the insurance 
does not apply to: 
l. Damage To Your Work 
“Property damage” to “your work” arising out of it or any 
part of it and included in the “products-completed operations 
hazard.”   
This exclusion does not apply if the damaged work or the 
work out of which the damage arises was performed on your 
behalf by a subcontractor.28 
A brief discussion of the history and development of the “Your 
Work” exclusion in ISO policies is instructive as to its meaning.  
The 1973 ISO policy excluded coverage for “property damage to 
work performed by or on behalf of the named insured arising out 
of the work or any portion thereof.”29  The language “or on behalf 
of the named insured” served to exclude coverage for damage to 
the insured’s own work even if it was caused by someone working 
on behalf of the insured—that is, a subcontractor.  This provision 
in the 1973 policy reflected that property damage to the insured’s 
own work caused by faulty work was an inherent risk in the 
 
25 MALECKI ET AL., supra note 16, at 384. 
26 Id. 
27 Black & Veatch Corp. v. Aspen Ins. (U.K.) Ltd., 882 F.3d 952, 958 (10th Cir. 
2018) (“For consistency, we refer to this provision as the ‘Your Work’ exclusion.”), 
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 151 (2018). 
28 Coverage Form (2013), supra note 16, at 553. 
29 Coverage Form (1973), supra note 24, at 492. 
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construction business and thereby was excluded from coverage, 
even if the faulty work was performed by a subcontractor.30 
Contractors began to subcontract work more often, and by 
1976, the ISO responded to pressure from the industry by re-
moving the phrase “or on behalf of” from the “Your Work” ex-
clusion, thereby restoring coverage for damage to the insured’s 
own work caused by a subcontractor.31  In 1986, the ISO clarified 
the “Your Work” exclusion by adding language that explicitly 
excepted subcontractor work.32  The effect of this language is to 
designate the insured and the subcontractor as separate entities 
under the “Your Work” exclusion, and provide that the insured 
will not be held liable for the subcontractor’s faulty work.33 
 
30 Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 959 (“[S]ubcontractor-caused damage was 
considered a risk inherent to the construction business and explicitly excluded from 
coverage in CGL policies.”). 
31 STEVEN PLITT ET AL., 9A COUCH ON INSURANCE § 129:19 (3d ed. 2019) (“[M]any 
general contractors were not satisfied with the lack of coverage . . . . In 1976, the in-
surance industry responded by the introduction of the Broad Form Property Damage 
Endorsement, which extended coverage to insureds for property damage caused by 
the work of their subcontractors.” (citing Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 
2004 WI 2, ¶¶ 67–68, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 N.W.2d 65)). See also Black & Veatch Corp., 
882 F.3d at 959 (“In response, the 1976 standard-form CGL policy eliminated the 
phrase ‘or on behalf of ’ from the ‘Your Work’ exclusion. The policy thus broadened 
coverage by no longer excluding damages arising from faulty subcontractor work.”). 
32 PLITT ET AL., supra note 31 (“The subcontractor exception to . . . ‘your work’ 
was added directly to the body of the policy in 1986.” (citing Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 
2004 WI 2, ¶¶ 67–68)). See also Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 959 (“In 1986, the 
ISO attempted to clear up this confusion by expressly stating in the standard-form 
CGL policy that the ‘Your Work’ exclusion does not apply ‘if the damaged work . . . 
was performed . . . by a subcontractor.’ ” (alterations in original)). The ISO explicitly 
stated in a contemporaneous circular that the revision to the “Your Work” exclusion 
was intended to provide coverage for “damage to, or caused by, a subcontractor’s 
work.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Commercial General Liability Program 
Instructions Pamphlet Furnished, CIRCULAR NO. GL-86-204 (Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., 
New York, N.Y.), July 15, 1986); see also Cypress Point Condo. Ass’n v. Adria 
Towers, L.L.C., 143 A.3d 273, 282 (N.J. 2016) (citing U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., 
Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 879 (Fla. 2007)). 
33 MALECKI ET AL., supra note 16, at 76–77. 
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II.  NEW YORK LAW 
A. Doctrines of Policy Interpretation34 
New York courts apply three doctrines of policy interpreta-
tion: (1) contra proferentem,35 (2) the reasonable expectations doc-
trine,36 and (3) a doctrine requiring that courts construe the 
policy as a whole.37 
1. Contra Proferentem 
The doctrine of contra proferentem provides that any ambi-
guities in the policy language should be interpreted “in favor of 
coverage” and “against the insurers,” even if both parties offer 
“reasonable interpretations” of the ambiguous language.38  The 
rationale for this doctrine is that the insurer is in the best 
position to resolve ambiguities in the policy language because the 
insurer creates the policy.39  
2. Reasonable Expectations Doctrine 
The reasonable expectations doctrine provides that the “ob-
jectively reasonable expectations” of the consumer in purchasing 
insurance must be protected, even if the policy provisions 
“negate[ ] those expectations.”40  The rationale for this doctrine is 
similar to the rationale for contra proferentem.  Purchasers of in-
surance are unlikely to have the level of sophistication necessary 
to interpret ambiguities in the policy; therefore, the insurer is 
obligated to make sure the policy coverage meets the purchaser’s 
 
34 These are universal policies of insurance contract interpretation applied by 
courts around the country. See French, supra note 9, at 109 (“When courts are asked 
to interpret and apply policy language, such as the definitions of ‘occurrence’ and 
‘property damage,’ there are three well-established rules of policy interpretation that 
are particularly relevant: (1) contra proferentem, (2) the ‘reasonable expectations’ 
doctrine, and (3) construction of the policy as a whole.”). 
35 1 ROBERT D. GOODMAN & STEVE VACCARO, NEW APPLEMAN NEW YORK 
INSURANCE LAW § 15.02 n.6 (2d ed. 2020) (collecting New York intermediate appel-
late court cases and federal district court cases applying New York law). 
36 Id. nn.3–4 (collecting cases). 
37 See Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 960–61. 
38 French, supra note 9, at 109 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 206 (AM. L. INST. 1981)). 
39 See id. at 109–10, 109 n.20. 
40 Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 
83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970). 
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expectations when purchasing the policy, and any misinterpreta-
tions are weighed against the insurer.41 
3. Construing the Policy as a Whole 
Finally, courts construe insurance policies such that all of 
the policy language is afforded a “fair meaning,” and “no provision” 
is left “without force or effect.”42  In other words, no provision of 
the policy should be read in isolation, and coverage should be 
interpreted by reading all of the policy provisions together.43   
B. New York Cases Interpreting “Occurrence” 
1. George A. Fuller Co. v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co.: 
The Leading New York Case on Faulty Work Coverage 
The New York Court of Appeals has not yet decided whether 
faulty work is an occurrence under standard form CGL policies.44  
The leading intermediate appellate court case is George A. Fuller 
Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,45 decided by the 
New York Appellate Division, First Department, in 1994.46  There, 
the court held that a contractor was not entitled to indemnifica-
tion for liability incurred due to faulty work.47 
In Fuller, a building owner hired the George A. Fuller Com-
pany (“Fuller”) to manage the construction of a mixed commercial 
and residential building in Manhattan.48  The contractor retained 
a subcontractor to install wood flooring, an aluminum wall, and a 
 
41 Id. at 969. 
42 Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 960–61 (quoting Roman Cath. Diocese of 
Brooklyn v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 21 N.Y.3d 139, 148 (N.Y. 2013)). 
43 French, supra note 9, at 112. 
44 See Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 956–57. 
45 This Note regards Fuller as the leading Appellate Division case for three 
reasons. First, Aspen’s lawyers in Black & Veatch “rel[ied] heavily” on Fuller. Id. at 
957. Second, the court itself pointed out that the other relevant appellate cases 
offered by Aspen either relied solely on Fuller, cited to other cases that relied on 
Fuller, or cited as persuasive Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979), 
a New Jersey Supreme Court case that was “effectively overturned” in Cypress Point 
Condominium Ass’n v. Adria Towers, L.L.C., 143 A.3d 273 (N.J. 2016). Black & 
Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 969–70. Third, other scholars have treated Fuller as the 
leading Appellate Division case as well. See, e.g., Qifu Li, Note, What America Can 
Learn from Canada’s Progressive Decision in Commercial General Liability Policy 
Coverage Litigation over Construction Defects, 23 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 
165, 166 (2014) (citing Fuller for the proposition that “New York’s case law holds 
that construction defects are not occurrences within CGL policies”). 
46 200 A.D.2d 255, 255 (1st Dep’t 1994). 
47 Id. at 261–62. 
48 Id. at 257. 
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water system that complied with the city code.49  Fuller procured 
a CGL policy for the project through United States Fidelity and 
Guaranty Company (“USF&G”).50  The policy insured Fuller for 
“ ‘property damage’ . . . caused by an ‘occurrence,’ which [the 
policy] defined as ‘an accident, including continuous or repeated 
exposure to substantially the same general harmful condi-
tions.’ ”51 The policy further excluded two kinds of damage: 
(1) property damage to “[t]hat particular part of real property on 
which you or any contractors or subcontractors working directly 
or indirectly on your behalf are performing operations if the 
‘property damage’ arises out of those operations”; and, (2) proper-
ty damage to “[t]hat particular part of any property that must be 
restored, repaired or replaced because ‘your work’ was incorrectly 
performed on it,” where “your work” was defined as “[w]ork or 
operations performed by you or on your behalf.”52  Therefore, the 
question arose as to whether the latter exclusion precluded cover-
age for damage to the contracted work caused by the contractor’s 
own negligent construction. 
The subcontractor’s negligent installation caused the wood 
flooring to buckle and allowed “water infiltration into the 
building” through the aluminum wall.53  As a result of the water 
damage, the water metering system had to be repaired.54  The 
building owner sued Fuller on various counts, and Fuller sought 
indemnification from USF&G, who ultimately denied coverage 
for the claim on the grounds that the damage was not an “occur-
rence” as defined in the policy.55  Fuller sought a declaration that 
USF&G was liable to defend Fuller in the underlying suit per the 
terms of the contract.56  The lower court granted Fuller’s cross 
motion for summary judgement, finding the water infiltration 
was continuous exposure to a generally harmful condition, which 
tracked the definition for occurrence under the policy.57 
The Appellate Division reversed.58  The court found Fuller’s 
faulty work was not an accident resulting in “continuous or re-
 
49 See id. 
50 Id. at 256–57. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 257 (alterations in original). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 257–58.  
56 Id. at 258. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 261–62. 
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peated exposure to substantially the same general harmful con-
ditions” because it was the result of “intentional cost-saving or 
negligent acts” which only affected the building owner’s “eco-
nomic interest in the building.”59  The court insisted that Fuller’s 
“contract default” was not an accident simply because Fuller al-
leged negligence.60  Therefore, the court found no occurrence un-
der the policy.61 
Nonetheless, the court found that even if Fuller’s faulty work 
were an occurrence, the policy expressly excluded from coverage 
damage to the contractor’s work.62  The court maintained that the 
CGL policy issued by USF&G “d[id] not insure against faulty 
workmanship in the work product itself but rather faulty work-
manship in the work product which creates a legal liability by 
causing bodily injury or property damage to something other 
than the work product.”63  In the court’s view, the CGL policy “was 
never intended to insure Fuller’s work product or Fuller’s com-
pliance . . . with its contractual obligations,” and to hold other-
wise “would transform USF&G into a surety for the performance 
of Fuller’s work.”64  Therefore, the court held that Fuller was not 
entitled to indemnification.65 
2. Black & Veatch Corp.: Refusing to Extend Fuller 
In Black & Veatch Corp., the lawyers for Aspen Insurance 
“relie[d] heavily” on Fuller, arguing that the Appellate Division’s 
refusal to extend CGL coverage beyond faulty workmanship in 
the work product which causes property damage to something 
other than the work product necessarily precluded faulty work 
from being a coverable occurrence under New York law.66  None-
theless, the court distinguished Fuller based on differences in the 
CGL policy at issue and the facts of the case.67   
The contractor Black & Veatch (“B&V”) purchased the CGL 
policy at issue through Aspen Insurance (“Aspen”).68  The policy 
 
59 Id. at 259. 
60 Id. at 259–60. 
61 Id. at 259. 
62 Id. at 260. 
63 Id. at 259. 
64 Id. at 260. 
65 Id. at 261–62. 
66 Black & Veatch Corp. v. Aspen Ins. (U.K.) Ltd., 882 F.3d 952, 967–68 (10th 
Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 151 (2018). 
67 Id. at 967–69. 
68 Id. at 955. 
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provided coverage for “ ‘Property Damage’ . . . caused by an ‘Oc-
currence.’ ”69  The contractor Black & Veatch (“B&V”) purchased 
the CGL policy at issue through Aspen Insurance (“Aspen”).  The 
policy contained the following definitions: 
• Occurrence: “an accident, including continuous or repeated 
exposure to substantially the same general harmful condi-
tions, that results in . . . ‘Property Damage’ that is not 
expected or not intended by the ‘Insured.’ ” 
• Property Damage: “physical injury to tangible property of a 
‘Third Party,’ including all resulting loss of use of that prop-
erty of a ‘Third Party’ . . . .” 
• Third Party: “any . . . entity . . . other than an ‘Insured.’ ”70 
Additionally, the policy defined an “Insured” as “any entity listed 
as a ‘Named Insured’ or designated as an ‘Additional Insured.’ ”71  
The policy further excluded coverage for “ ‘Property Damage’ to 
‘Your Work,’ ” where “ ‘Your Work’ is defined as ‘work operations 
performed by you or on your behalf’ by a subcontractor.”72  Final-
ly, the policy included an exception to that exclusion, providing 
that the exclusion “does not apply if the damaged work or the 
work out of which the damage arises was performed on [B&V’s] 
behalf by a subcontractor.”73  The question thus arose as to wheth-
er that exception to the exclusion allowed coverage for the 
subcontractor’s faulty work. 
The court found that B&V was entitled to indemnification for 
four main reasons.  First, the damage to the reactors was an oc-
currence under the policy and qualified as coverable property 
damage.74  Second, the subcontractor exception to the “Your 
Work” exclusion was added by the ISO specifically to preserve 
coverage for faulty work performed by subcontractors.75  Third, 
the overwhelming trend of state supreme courts around the coun-
try was to hold that faulty work can constitute an occurrence, 
and that contractors are covered for unexpected damage caused 
by subcontractor work.76  Fourth, Fuller did not compel a conclusion 
 
69 Id. (alteration in original). 
70 Id. (citations omitted). 
71 Id. at 963. 
72 Id. at 955. 
73 Id. at 956 (alteration in original). 
74 Id. at 965. 
75 Id. at 959–60. 
76 Id. at 966 (citing French, supra note 9, at 122–23). 
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in favor of the insurance provider because it was distinguishable 
on its facts.77   
As to the first reason, the court found that the damage to the 
reactors was an occurrence under the policy because it was 
caused by an accident.78  B&V neither expected nor intended for 
their subcontractors to perform faulty work, nor did they engage 
in reckless cost-cutting like the contractor in Fuller.79  The court 
rejected Aspen’s argument and concluded that the damage was 
coverable “property damage” under the policy because the plant 
owner was a third party, not an additional insured under the 
policy.80  The court concluded instead that the plant owner was 
an additional insured only for liability “arising out of operations 
performed by the Named Insured,” but the subcontractor who 
performed the work at issue was not a named insured under the 
policy.81   
The court bolstered its finding that faulty subcontractor 
work was an occurrence under the policy by concluding that the 
definition of occurrence would not make sense when construed 
along with the business risk exclusions unless the definition 
included faulty work.82  The court found that reading the defini-
tion of occurrence to exclude the damage to B&V’s work product 
would render the “Your Work” exclusion and the subcontractor 
exception to that exclusion superfluous, in violation of New York 
law.83  According to the court’s reasoning, the provision excluding 
coverage for damage to the insured’s own work necessarily 
implied that those damages were not “categorically and preemp-
tively preclude[d]” by “the definition of “occurrence’ ”; otherwise, 
the exclusion would be surplusage.84  Moreover, the policy would 
not provide an exception to the “Your Work” exclusion for work 
performed by a subcontractor unless faulty work was a coverable 
occurrence under the policy to begin with.85  For these reasons, 
the court rejected Aspen’s argument that the subcontractor ex-
 
77 Id. at 968–69. 
78 Id. at 962–63. 
79 Id.  
80 Id. at 963–64. 
81 Id. at 963.  
82 Id. at 964–65. 
83 Id. at 964 (“CGL policies [must] be construed ‘in a way that affords a fair 
meaning to all of the language . . . in the contract and leaves no provision without 
force and effect.’ ”) (second alteration in original) (quoting Roman Cath. Diocese of 
Brooklyn v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 21 N.Y.3d 139, 148 (N.Y. 2013))). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
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ception impermissibly creates coverage for damage that is not a 
coverable occurrence under the basic insuring agreement, and 
held that the damage to the reactors was an occurrence.86  
As noted above, the court held that Fuller did not compel a 
conclusion in favor of the insurance provider because it was 
distinguishable on its facts,87 despite the rule that federal courts 
applying state law should defer to intermediate appellate courts 
when no high court decision has been made.88  The court found 
that the Fuller rationale did not apply to the damage for which 
B&V sought indemnification, because Aspen presented no evi-
dence that B&V had sought to cut corners by accepting 
excessively low subcontractor bids or by using inferior materi-
als.89  The contractor in Fuller was not entitled to indemnification 
because “a CGL policy covers damages only when they were 
‘unexpected and unintentional,’ ”90 and Fuller’s attempt at “reck-
less cost-saving” so “increased the likelihood” of faulty subcontractor 
work as to make it expected.91  In contrast, the court held that 
B&V’s damages were accidental: while B&V may have taken a 
“calculated risk” in hiring a subcontractor to manufacture the 
internal parts, that risk alone simply did not amount to an 
expectation or intention that the subcontractor’s work would be 
faulty.92  Therefore, the faulty subcontractor work was an occur-
rence under the policy. 
Moreover, the Black & Veatch Corp. court found that Fuller 
did not even address “whether damages caused by a subcontrac-
tor are covered by a CGL policy that expressly provides coverage 
for damages to an insured’s work arising from a subcontractor’s 
faulty workmanship,” because the policy in Fuller did not include 
a subcontractor exception.93  The policy in Fuller simply excluded 
coverage for damage to the insured’s own work product, full stop, 
“regardless of whether the contractor or its subcontractor caused 
the damages.”94  Even if the damages at issue in Fuller had been 
caused by an occurrence under the policy, they would have been 
 
86 Id. at 965. 
87 Id. at 968–69. 
88 Id. at 967. 
89 Id. at 968–69. 




93 Id. at 968. 
94 Id. 
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excluded from coverage by the “Your Work” exclusion.  Therefore, 
the court declined to extend Fuller’s holding to say that “the 
damages at issue [in Black & Veatch Corp.] can never be an 
occurrence.”95 
III.  USING A SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE 
STANDARD TO DETERMINE WHETHER A POLICYHOLDER 
EXPECTED OR INTENDED FAULTY WORK 
Because the definition of “occurrence” is contingent on there 
being an accident that is not expected or intended from the 
standpoint of the insured, a relevant question is whether expec-
tation or intention is a purely subjective standard.  The court in 
Black & Veatch Corp. applied a purely subjective standard, 
relying heavily on arguments made by Professor Cristopher C. 
French in an article regarding CGL coverage for defective work.96  
However, the Supreme Court of Ohio applied a more objective 
standard in Ohio Northern University, which was dispositive in 
the court’s decision that faulty work is not a coverable 
occurrence. 
A. The Subjective Standard Argued for by Professor Christopher 
C. French  
Professor French argues that defective work should be a 
coverable occurrence, whether it is caused by a subcontractor or 
the general contractor on a project.97  French’s argument goes a 
 
95 Id. (emphasis added). 
96 See id. at 959–60 (citing French, supra note 9, at 107–08). The court’s analysis 
of New York law seems to suggest that New York applies a purely subjective 
standard. The court cited Continental Casualty Co. v. Rapid-American Corp., 80 
N.Y.2d 640, 649 (1993), for the proposition that CGL policies “are to be construed as 
barring coverage ‘only when the insured intended the damages.’ ” Black & Veatch 
Corp., 882 F.3d at 960 (emphasis omitted). The court went on to state that “[a] 
policyholder might take a ‘calculated risk’—such as hiring a subcontractor—without 
‘expecting’ damages to occur.” Id. at 962. Nonetheless, it would serve the New York 
Court of Appeals well to clarify exactly whether the standard it applies is purely 
subjective.  
97 See French, supra note 9, at 143 (“[T]he inescapable conclusion is that construc-
tion defects are occurrences unless the insurer can prove the policyholder actually 
expected or intended to do the construction work at issue defectively and expected or 
intended that it would cause damage.”); see also Christian H. Robertson II, Note, 
Defective Construction CGL Coverage: The Subcontractor Exception, 7 MICH. BUS. & 
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 159, 174 (2017) (“French concludes that courts should 
presume that all faulty workmanship—even that of the insured—constitutes an 
occurrence covered, unless either the insurer proves otherwise or the policy 
specifically excludes coverage.”). 
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step further than the view adopted by the majority of state 
courts, which only indemnify contractors for defective work per-
formed by a subcontractor.98  French proposes a simple methodology 
for analyzing CGL insurance policies: “[I]n most cases, whether 
the damage associated with the defective workmanship is actu-
ally covered by CGL insurance should be determined based on an 
analysis of whether any of the business risk exclusions apply.”99 
French’s argument hinges on the notion that the standard 
for determining whether faulty work is accidental should be 
completely subjective, in the sense that insurers cannot deny 
coverage unless they prove that the insured subjectively expected 
or intended the damage.100  French argues that the subjective 
standard is baked into the language of a standard form CGL 
policy, which states that the injury or damage is excluded from 
coverage if it was “expected or intended from the standpoint of 
the insured.”101  The exclusion for expectation or intention neither 
imposes a reasonableness standard nor a standard that relies on 
probability or likelihood, but suggests a subjective standard fo-
cused on the insured party’s perspective.102  From there, French 
makes the supposition that construction defects are rarely 
expected or intended from the insured’s standpoint, whether they 
can be attributed to the subcontractor’s work or not, and there-
fore they should not be categorically excluded from coverage.103 
While many courts have applied a subjective standard, none 
have gone as far as French.  Most find that faulty work is an oc-
 
98 See Robertson, supra note 97. 
99 French, supra note 9, at 144–45. 
100 See id. at 115–17. French’s argument features two additional points that do 
not merit discussion here, namely that: (1) state courts which find no occurrence 
often rely on older cases like Weedo, which are outdated because they were decided 
before the ISO instituted major changes in CGL insurance policies; and (2) the 
“moral hazard” argument, which insurance companies employ to argue that CGL 
coverage for the insured’s own faulty work lessens incentives for contractors to 
reduce their probability of error, is weakened by other, more powerful incentives 
that do not implicate insurance indemnification. Id. at 119, 141; see also Robertson, 
supra note 97, at 172–74.  
101 French, supra note 9, at 116. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 143 (“[T]he inescapable conclusion is that construction defects are 
occurrences unless the insurer can prove the policyholder actually expected or 
intended to do the construction work at issue defectively and expected or intended 
that it would cause damage.”). French draws an analogy to car insurance, which 
consumers purchase to indemnify themselves from the foreseeable result of their 
own negligent driving, and poses the question: “If construction defect claims, the 
most common claims asserted against contractors, were not covered by CGL insur-
ance, then why would or should a contractor even buy CGL insurance?” Id. at 104. 
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currence only when it was performed by a subcontractor and 
decline to extend that holding to faulty work performed by the 
insured.  For example, in National Surety Corp. v. Westlake In-
vestments, L.L.C., the Iowa Supreme Court held that a modern 
CGL policy covered property damage arising out of defective 
subcontractor work.104  The court reviewed a jury verdict that the 
petitioners claimed was the result of improper jury instruction; 
the trial judge had instructed the jury that “[d]efective con-
struction work performed by an insured is not covered by the 
policy; however, defective construction work performed by 
subcontractors may be an ‘occurrence’ under the policy.”105  The 
court held that the jury instruction was not improper because the 
policy at issue contemplated coverage for defective subcontractor 
work.106  The court applied a subjective standard for the same 
reasons suggested by French: the policy provided coverage for an 
accident “from the standpoint of the insured.”107  The court made 
clear that the standard is purely subjective, finding that defective 
subcontractor work would not be an accident only if it were the 
“natural and expected result of the insured’s actions,” or “highly 
probable whether the insured was negligent or not.”108 
Likewise, in Cypress Point Condominium Ass’n v. Adria 
Towers, L.L.C., the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a 
subcontractor’s faulty work was an occurrence under a standard 
form CGL policy.109  Like the court in National Surety, the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey found that whether damages were an ac-
cident depended on whether they were expected or intended.110  
 
104 880 N.W.2d 724, 740 (Iowa 2016) (“Accordingly, we interpret the insuring 
agreement in the modern standard-form CGL policy as providing coverage for prop-
erty damage arising out of defective work performed by an insured’s subcontractor 
unless the resulting property damage is specifically precluded from coverage by an 
exclusion or endorsement.”). 
105 Id. at 734. 
106 Id. at 736. 
107 Id. (“Considered from the standpoint of the insured, ‘a deliberate act, per-
formed negligently, is an accident if the effect is not the intended or expected result; 
that is, the result would have been different had the deliberate act been performed 
correctly.’ ” (quoting Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 8 
(Tex. 2007))).  
108 Id. The court cited United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Shelly Funeral Home, Inc., 
642 N.W.2d 648, 652, 654 (Iowa 2002), as an example, in which the court concluded 
that damage caused by the insured’s negligent supervision of their employee still 
constituted an occurrence because the insured did not know its omission to act would 
result in the harmful consequences. Nat’l Surety Corp., 880 N.W.2d at 735.  
109 143 A.3d 273, 288 (N.J. 2016). 
110 Id. at 287.  
2020] NEW YORK’S APPROACH TO FAULTY WORK 321 
However, unlike the court in National Surety, the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey was less clear about whether that standard was 
purely subjective.  The court cited to Travelers Indemnity Co. of 
America v. Moore & Associates, Inc., in which the Supreme Court 
of Tennessee held that expectation or intention is determined 
from the perspective of the insured,111 but the court concluded 
that it needed to determine whether the “poor workmanship was 
foreseeable.”112  The court’s appeal to foreseeability, without qual-
ifying whether foreseeability is determined from the perspective 
of the insured, suggests that it was not applying a subjective 
standard as pure as that applied by the courts in National Surety 
and Black & Veatch Corp.   
Nonetheless, the court did not seem to rely on the foresee-
ability analysis in reaching the conclusion that the defective 
work was an occurrence.  Instead, the court rejected the insurance 
company’s argument that the alleged damage resulting from 
breach of contract could not give rise to a coverable occurrence.113  
The court found that breach of contract claims were barred from 
CGL coverage because of the business risk exclusions, not be-
cause such claims were not initially covered as an occurrence.114 
B. Applying an Objective Standard for Determining Whether 
Damages Are Accidental 
One alternative to French’s subjective standard is to apply 
an objective standard that determines whether faulty work dam-
ages are accidental based on the amount of control the contractor 
had over the subcontractor’s work.115  In Westfield Insurance Co. 
v. Custom Agri Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court of Ohio appeared 
to forecast a control test by suggesting that the general contrac-
tor’s control over the process is relevant to coverage for faulty 
work.116  While the court ultimately denied coverage for the 
 
111 Id.; see Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Moore & Assocs., Inc., 216 S.W.3d 302, 
308 (Tenn. 2007).  
112 Cypress Point Condo. Ass’n, 143 A.3d at 287. 
113 Id. at 287–88. 
114 Id. 
115 See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 97, at 189–90 (“First, courts should presume 
CGL coverage for defective work performed by the insured’s subcontractor unless the 
policy clearly excludes the specific coverage without exception; second, that pre-
sumption might be overcome if evidence shows that the insured had sufficient 
control of the work that resulted in defective construction.” (emphasis omitted)).  
116 133 Ohio St. 3d 476, 2012-Ohio-4712, 979 N.E.2d 269, at ¶ 13 (“The key 
issues are whether the contractor controlled the process leading to the damages and 
whether the damages were anticipated.” (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)).  
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faulty work of a general contractor in that case, at least one 
commentator debated whether the court would explicitly apply 
the control test in a later case involving faulty subcontractor 
work on the basis that subcontractor work cannot be controlled 
by the general contractor.117  
However, in October of 2018, the Supreme Court of Ohio 
reached a final decision in Ohio Northern University, holding 
that faulty subcontractor work is not a coverable occurrence 
under standard form CGL policies because it “cannot be deemed 
fortuitous.”118  Although the court was bound by their previous 
decision in Custom Agri, it did not appear to interpret Custom 
Agri as creating a control test; instead, it interpreted the earlier 
case to hold that faulty work is not a coverable occurrence 
because it is never fortuitous.119  The court then applied that 
holding to the faulty subcontractor work at issue, and deter-
mined that faulty work is not a coverable occurrence whether it 
is caused by a subcontractor or not, because it is not fortuitous.120  
In essence, the court appeared to hold that even where a contrac-
tor has little to no control over the quality of its subcontractor’s 
work, faulty work by a subcontractor is foreseeable enough to 
never qualify as a coverable “occurrence.”   
IV.  WHETHER THE COST OF REPAIRING AND 
REPLACING THE DEFECTIVE WORK ITSELF 
IS COVERABLE PROPERTY DAMAGE 
The majority of courts hold that the cost of repairing or 
replacing defective work alone is not coverable property damage 
under standard form CGL policies absent damage to other prop-
erty.121  For example, in Capstone Building Corp. v. American 
 
117 See Robertson, supra note 97, at 186–87. 
118 Ohio N. Univ. v. Charles Constr. Servs., Inc., 155 Ohio St. 3d 197, 2018-Ohio-
4057, 120 N.E.3d 762, at ¶ 3. 
119 Id. ¶¶ 17–18 (noting that “[i]nherent in the plain meaning of ‘accident’ is the 
doctrine of fortuity,” and “claims for faulty workmanship, such as the one in the 
present case, are not fortuitous in the context of a CGL policy like the one here” 
(quoting Custom Agri, 133 Ohio St. 3d 476, 2012-Ohio-4712, 979 N.E.2d 269, at 
¶¶ 13–14)).  
120 Ohio N. Univ., 155 Ohio St. 3d 197, 2018-Ohio-4057, 120 N.E.3d 762, at ¶ 27. 
121 French, supra note 9, at 128–29 (“Many courts have held that construction 
defects can be occurrences, but only to the extent that property other than the 
defective work itself was damaged. This is becoming the majority position of the 
state supreme courts that have addressed the issue . . . .”). Note that, like the issue 
as to whether faulty work is an “occurrence,” this issue is one of initial coverage—
the claimed damage may be initially coverable within the definition of property 
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Motorists Insurance Co., the Supreme Court of Connecticut held 
that the cost of repairing and replacing defective work alone did 
not constitute coverable property damage under a standard form 
CGL policy.122  The plaintiffs sought indemnification for liabilities 
incurred by water damage and other collateral damage to the 
third party’s property, as well as “defective work, standing alone, 
including building and fire safety code violations.”123  The court 
found that the damage to the property not involved in the work 
was coverable property damage, but declined to extend the 
definition of property damage to the defective work alone.124   
The court focused on the term “physical injury” in the def-
inition of property damage, and concluded that the term 
presupposed that the work was not defective or defectively 
installed prior to delivery, but was injured after delivery or 
installation by faulty work.125  Therefore, the court held that the 
cost of repairing and replacing defective work was not coverable 
property damage because the work was defective from its incep-
tion, rather than as a result of some physical injury that altered 
the once-nondefective product.126 
V.  ARGUMENT 
A. Black & Veatch Corp. Correctly Distinguished Fuller 
The Black & Veatch Corp. court correctly distinguished Fuller 
on two distinct bases.  First, the court placed appropriate empha-
sis on the fact that Fuller undertook bad faith cost-cutting, while 
 
damage, but the particular policy at issue may ultimately exclude the property 
damage from coverage in one of the business risk exclusions, such as the “Your 
Work” exclusion. Capstone Bldg. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 67 A.3d 961, 976 
(Conn. 2013) (“Although a contractor’s work will often be excluded from coverage 
pursuant to contractual exclusions in a commercial general liability policy, this dis-
tinction is not found in the plain language of the insuring agreement’s initial grant 
of coverage.”). 
122 67 A.3d at 969 (holding that “defective work standing alone or repairs to that 
defective work do not constitute property damage and, therefore, are not covered 
under the particular insurance policy in the present case”). 
123 Id. at 976. 
124 Id. at 979. 
125 Id. at 980. 
126 Id. at 982 (noting that “ ‘physical injury’ unambiguously connotes damage to 
tangible property causing an alteration in appearance, shape, color or in other 
material dimension” (quoting Traveler’s Ins. Co. v. Eljer Mfg., Inc., 757 N.E.2d 481, 
502 (Ill. 2001))). 
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Black & Veatch did not.127  Second, the court identified a provision 
in the CGL policy at issue in Fuller that expressly excluded cov-
erage for damages to the insured’s own work, whether that 
damage resulted from an occurrence or not.128  The court correctly 
found that the ISO no longer includes that provision in their CGL 
policies, and that provision was absent from the policy at issue in 
Black & Veatch Corp.129   
1. Fuller Involved Bad-Faith Cost Cutting 
The Black & Veatch Corp. court correctly held that Fuller is 
distinguishable because the contractor in that case undertook 
bad faith cost-cutting.  The Fuller court did not claim that faulty 
work lacks the fortuity required to constitute an accident, as 
other scholars and courts have claimed.130  Rather, the Fuller court 
made clear that the particular faulty work at issue was not 
fortuitous enough to constitute an occurrence because it resulted 
from reckless cost-cutting measures.131  In other words, Fuller 
was more than merely negligent for failing to expect faulty work 
by its subcontractors; Fuller knew its subcontractors were 
inferior but hired them anyway to save money.132  That fact was 
enough to dissuade the Fuller court from ordering USF&G to 
indemnify Fuller,133 even if Fuller did not expect or intend sub-
contractor error on a purely subjective level.  In contrast, Aspen 
did not allege any cost-cutting by Black & Veatch,134 let alone 
recklessness.  Black & Veatch had no reason to expect that their 
subcontractor’s work would be faulty beyond the notion that 
faulty work is always a remote possibility. 
 
127 Black & Veatch Corp. v. Aspen Ins. (U.K.) Ltd., 882 F.3d 952, 968–69 (10th 
Cir. 2018). 
128 Id. at 968. 
129 Id. at 969, 971. 
130 Compare PLITT ET AL., supra note 31, § 129:4 (collecting cases to support the 
proposition that “[a] claim for faulty workmanship, in and of itself, is not an 
occurrence under a commercial general liability policy because a failure of work-
manship does not involve the fortuity required to constitute an accident”), with 
George A. Fuller Co. v. U.S. Fid. and Guar. Co., 200 A.D.2d 255, 259 (1st Dep’t 1994) 
(finding that the property damage resulted from “intentional cost-saving or 
negligent acts”). 
131 George A. Fuller Co., 200 A.D.2d at 259. Unfortunately, there are no trial 
court documents to show precisely what those cost cutting measures were. 
132 Id. 
133 See id. 
134 Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 968–69. 
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Admittedly, the factual distinction would be much clearer if 
the Fuller court had specified exactly what kind of cost-cutting 
measures Fuller employed.  Nonetheless, the Black & Veatch Corp. 
court fairly posited that reckless cost-cutting is risky, bad-faith 
behavior sufficiently culpable to stand in for expectation or inten-
tion, whereas subcontracting work on a large and complex piece 
of machinery, without more, does not create an expectation or 
intention that a subcontractor will perform faulty work.  
2. The Policy in Fuller Was Different from the Policy in Black 
& Veatch Corp. 
The Black & Veatch Corp. court was also correct in finding 
that the CGL policy at issue in Fuller was markedly different 
from the one in Black & Veatch Corp.  The policy in Fuller barred 
coverage via an exclusion that is no longer part of the standard 
form policy issued by the ISO.135  Even if the Fuller court had de-
cided that the damage at issue was caused by an occurrence 
despite Fuller’s bad faith cost-cutting, the policy expressly 
excluded coverage for damage caused to the insured’s own work.  
In contrast, while the policy in Black & Veatch Corp. also ex-
cluded damage to the insured’s own work, it excepted from that 
exclusion damage to the insured’s own work caused by the work 
of a subcontractor.   
Therefore, the Fuller court’s holding that the policy “d[id] not 
insure against faulty workmanship in the work product itself but 
rather faulty workmanship in the work product which create[d] a 
legal liability by causing bodily injury or property damage to 
something other than the work product”136 made sense only as 
applied to that particular CGL policy.  Modern CGL policies like 
the one B&V purchased only exclude coverage for faulty work 
performed by the insured general contractor, and not for faulty 
work performed by their subcontractor. 
Moreover, even under an outdated Fuller policy, the exclu-
sion for faulty work has no bearing on whether faulty work is an 
“occurrence” in the first place.137  That is decided only on the 
basis of whether the resulting damages were expected or 
intended from the standpoint of the insured.  If faulty work were 
 
135 See discussion supra Part I. 
136 George A. Fuller Co., 200 A.D.2d at 259.  
137 See Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 958 (“[A] CGL policy starts with a 
broad grant of coverage for damages arising from an ‘occurrence.’ Exclusions narrow 
the scope of coverage.”). 
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never an occurrence, it would not be necessary for the policy to 
exclude it from the initial grant of coverage for occurrences that 
cause property damage.  As the court stated in Black & Veatch 
Corp., “Fuller does not stand for the proposition that damages 
caused by a subcontractor’s faulty workmanship can never con-
stitute an ‘occurrence’ under a CGL policy.”138  
The policy in Fuller was a completely different CGL policy 
than either the policy in Black & Veatch Corp. or any modern 
standard form CGL policy.  Indeed, the Black & Veatch Corp. court 
emphasized this fact, and found that Fuller relied on two 
intermediate appellate court cases that were decided before the 
ISO originated the subcontractor exception and expressly de-
clared that it was intended to preserve coverage for property 
damage caused by subcontractor work.139   
Because Fuller is distinguishable, the New York Court of 
Appeals would not contradict Appellate Division precedent by 
holding that faulty subcontractor work is an occurrence under 
standard form CGL policies.  Therefore, New York’s legal envi-
ronment is ripe for such a holding. 
B. The New York Court of Appeals Should Apply a Purely 
Subjective Standard 
The New York Court of Appeals should apply a purely sub-
jective standard to determine whether a contractor expected or 
intended faulty work for three reasons.  First, New York law does 
not preclude the use of a subjective standard.  Second, Professor 
French’s approach to policy interpretation applying a purely 
subjective standard best comports with the doctrines of insurance 
policy interpretation.  Third, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision 
applying an objective standard is based on flawed precedent. 
1. New York Law Does Not Preclude a Subjective Standard 
The court in Black & Veatch Corp. appeared to conclude that 
New York law applies a purely subjective standard to determine 
whether an accident was expected or intended.140  But Aspen did 
 
138 Id. at 957. 
139 Id. at 968; see also discussion supra Section II.B.1. 
140 Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 960 (“The New York Court of Appeals has 
held that damages are accidental so long as they are ‘unexpected and unintentional.’ 
These terms are to be construed as barring coverage ‘only when the insured intended 
the damages.’ The fact that an insured might have foreseen the possibility that its 
subcontractor would build a defective product does not render the resulting damages 
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not argue that B&V expected or intended the faulty subcontrac-
tor work, nor did B&V engage in bad faith cost-cutting like the 
contractor in Fuller.141  Thus, the court did not have occasion to 
rule on whether the standard is purely subjective.  Nonetheless, 
a future New York Court of Appeals decision could easily apply a 
subjective standard to the definition of accident and determine 
that subcontractor work is a coverable occurrence under stan-
dard form CGL policies, as the court did in National Surety 
Corp.142  In fact, National Surety Corp.’s limit on coverage for in-
stances where the resulting damage was highly probable, re-
gardless of whether the contractor was negligent, coincides with 
Fuller’s finding that bad-faith cost cutting estops the contractor 
from later seeking coverage for faulty subcontractor work.  Bad-
faith cost cutting is the very kind of behavior that makes 
damages caused by faulty subcontractor work highly probable, 
whether the general contractor adequately supervises the sub-
contractor or not.143   
Additionally, the New York Court of Appeals can use the 
same reasoning as the court in Cypress Point Condominium Ass’n 
to cast aside the Fuller court’s notion that subcontractor error 
results merely in an uncoverable breach of contract rather than a 
coverable accident.  The definition of “occurrence” does not distin-
guish between tort or breach of contract actions at least for the 
purpose of initial coverage, notwithstanding any exclusions from 
coverage later in the policy.  Other courts have applied the same 
reasoning.144 
 
intentional . . . .” (citations omitted)). The court further maintained that a person 
may engage in behavior that involves a calculated risk without expecting that an 
accident will occur; “[i]n fact, people often seek insurance for just such 
circumstances.” Id. at 962 (citation omitted). 
141 Id. at 968. 
142 880 N.W.2d 724, 740 (Iowa 2016). 
143 In United Fire & Casualty Co., the case offered by the court in National 
Surety Corp. for the proposition that negligent supervision does not create an ex-
pectation or intention of bodily injury without some affirmative act, the court found 
that “the term ‘expected’ in such an exclusion denotes knowledge by the ‘actor’ that 
certain consequences will flow from the intentional actions.” 642 N.W.2d 648, 653 
(Iowa 2002). In a case such as Fuller, the contractor’s intentional act is cost cutting. 
144 See, e.g., U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 884 (Fla. 2007) 
(“[T]here is nothing in the basic coverage language of the current CGL policy to 
support any definitive tort/contract line of demarcation for purposes of determining 
whether a loss is covered by the CGL’s initial grant of coverage. ‘Occurrence’ is not 
defined by reference to the legal category of the claim.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶ 41, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 
673 N.W.2d 65)). 
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2. French’s Approach to CGL Policy Interpretation Best 
Comports with the Doctrines of Insurance Policy 
Interpretation145 and Saves Litigation Costs 
Ultimately, French’s argument in favor of assuming defective 
work was accidental regardless of whether it was caused by the 
work of a contractor or a subcontractor best comports with the doc-
trines of insurance policy interpretation: (1) contra proferentem, 
(2) the reasonable expectations doctrine, and (3) construing the 
policy as a whole.  
First and most importantly, French’s approach makes the 
most sense based on the language of the policy when it is read as 
a whole.  The very existence of the business risk exclusion for 
damage to the insured’s own work—and the exception to that 
exclusion for damage to the insured’s own work caused by faulty 
subcontractor work—would be completely unnecessary if those 
damages did not pass the threshold occurrence test to begin with.  
To avoid rendering the business risk exclusions and their ex-
ceptions mere surplusage, those provisions must be given their 
full effect. 
Second, to the extent that the policy’s “accident” language is 
ambiguous, the doctrine of contra proferentem supports finding 
coverage in favor of the insured.  Not only is the insurer in the 
best position to avoid confusion over the extent of coverage 
because it drafts the policy, but also the insurer can more easily 
telegraph the limits of coverage by drafting them into the 
business risk exclusions, rather than hoping that the courts will 
interpret ambiguous terms like “occurrence” in its favor.   
Third, construing CGL policies to indemnify contractors for 
faulty subcontractor work better comports with the reasonable 
expectations doctrine.  Contractors purchasing CGL insurance 
policies surely purchase them with the expectation that they will 
be indemnified for liability incurred by accidental negligence, 
which includes faulty subcontractor work.  Otherwise, the CGL 
policies would not have the risk-shifting effect sought by 
contractors.  
Finally, by assuming that faulty work was accidental and 
moving directly to the business risk exclusions to determine if 
there is coverage, French’s approach saves litigation costs other-
wise spent on determining difficult fact issues like “objective 
intent” or “sufficient control.”  For these reasons, the New York 
 
145 See discussion supra Sections II.A, III.A. 
2020] NEW YORK’S APPROACH TO FAULTY WORK 329 
Court of Appeals should conclude that faulty work is an “oc-
currence” for the purpose of standard form CGL policies, unless 
the insurer can show intent or bad-faith cost cutting, and the 
Court should look to the business risk exclusions to limit 
coverage. 
3. The Supreme Court of Ohio’s Decision in Ohio Northern 
University Is Based on Flawed Precedent  
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in Ohio Northern 
University followed the precedent set in Custom Agri, a case in 
which the court misinterpreted CGL policy language.  There, the 
court based its decision to apply the doctrine of fortuity when 
analyzing CGL policies on language from a lower court deci-
sion.146  The court quoted JTO, Inc. v. State Automobile Mutual 
Insurance Co. for the proposition that faulty work claims are not 
covered unless they cause consequential damage, because faulty 
work is not fortuitous, and coverage should instead be deter-
mined by analyzing the amount of control the contractor had over 
the project and “whether the damages were anticipated.”147  The 
quoted language went on to state that there is generally no 
coverage for damages to the insured’s own work and that the 
intent of the policies is to exclude coverage for business risks.148 
The quoted language misinterpreted CGL policy language.  
Claims for damages to the insured’s own work—rather than for 
“consequential” damages to other property—caused by faulty 
work are denied coverage because damage to the insured’s own 
work is expressly excluded from coverage in the business risk 
exclusions, and not because faulty work fails to pass the occur-
rence threshold.  Indeed, for those policies to cover consequential 
damages caused by faulty work, they would first need to conclude 
that such faulty work was an accidental occurrence.  Therefore, 
the Supreme Court of Ohio should have overruled Custom Agri 
because it was based on a flawed interpretation of CGL policy 
language. 
 
146 Westfield Ins. v. Custom Agri Sys., Inc., 133 Ohio St. 3d 476, 2012-Ohio-4712, 
979 N.E.2d 269, at ¶ 13.  
147 Id. (“The key issues are whether the contractor controlled the process leading 
to the damages and whether the damages were anticipated.” (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting JTO, Inc. v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 194 Ohio App. 3d 319, 2011-Ohio-
1452, 956 N.E.2d 328, at ¶ 32)). 
148 Id. (quoting JTO, Inc., 194 Ohio App. 3d 319, 2011-Ohio-1452, 956 N.E.2d 
328, at ¶ 33). 
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The Court also cited as persuasive the Kentucky Supreme 
Court’s decision in Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Motorists Mutual 
Insurance Co.,149 a decision that was “laden with errors and poor 
reasoning.”150  There, the court seemed to contradict itself by con-
cluding that even though an unintended loss is fortuitous, and it 
is rare for a contractor to intend to damage their own work 
product, defective workmanship is not an accidental occur-
rence.151  The court reasoned that the opposite holding would 
cause CGL policies to become performance bonds by allowing any 
claim of faulty workmanship to be a coverable occurrence unless 
the insurer could prove the contractor’s error was intentional.152  
As Professor French points out in his critique of the holding, that 
is the very purpose of insurance policies—to indemnify the policy 
holder for their unintentional negligence, regardless of their 
fault.153  Therefore, Ohio Northern University relies on case law 
which fundamentally misunderstands CGL insurance policies.  
The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision further reveals the perils 
of applying objective standards like foreseeability or control to 
CGL insurance policies: they virtually bar claims based on faulty 
work, because contractors always have control over their own 
work, and it is always foreseeable to some extent that faulty 
work will lead to damages.  In essence, a control test is impossi-
ble to implement while preserving any kind of coverage for faulty 
work claims—even those for property damage to third-party 
property.  Such a holding is fatal to coverage under a policy that 
contractors pay into with the specific intention of shifting the 
risk of liability for their own negligence onto the insurer. 
The Supreme Court of Ohio should have concluded that 
faulty work passes the occurrence threshold unless it is subjec-
tively expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured, 
but that faulty work is excluded from coverage under the busi-
ness risk exclusions unless the faulty work was performed by a 
 
149 306 S.W.3d 69 (Ky. 2010). 
150 French, supra note 9, at 138. 
151 Cincinnati Ins. Co., 306 S.W.3d at 74–75; see also French, supra note 9, at 
139. 
152 Cincinnati Ins. Co., 306 S.W.3d at 75; see also French, supra note 9, at 139 
(“[T]he court then mistakenly concluded that construction defects cannot be occur-
rences because that would mean that any time construction work is unintentionally 
done poorly by a subcontractor, and the defective work causes damage, there would 
be coverage unless an exclusion in the policy otherwise eliminates coverage.”). 
153 French, supra note 9, at 139 (arguing that “one of the primary reasons why 
people and businesses buy insurance” is “to protect themselves against liability for 
injuries unintentionally caused by their negligence”). 
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subcontractor.  This would have allowed the court to preserve the 
overall result of its holding in Custom Agri by excluding the 
general contractor’s faulty work from coverage based on the 
business risk exclusions, rather than declaring that faulty work 
can never pass the occurrence threshold.  Then, the court could 
have allowed coverage in Ohio Northern University because 
subcontractor work is an exception to the “Your Work” exclusion. 
C. The New York Court of Appeals Should Also Hold that the 
Cost of Repairing and Replacing Faulty Work Is Coverable 
“Property Damage” Under CGL Policies 
The New York Court of Appeals should also hold that the 
cost of repairing and replacing defective subcontractor work 
meets the threshold for coverable “property damage” under CGL 
policies.  The Capstone Building Corp. court’s reasoning for pre-
cluding the defective work itself from coverage “neglects the ‘loss 
of use’ language in the second definition of property damage.”154  
Modern standard form CGL policies cover two kinds of property 
damage: (1) “physical injury to tangible property, including all 
resulting loss of use of that property,” and (2) “loss of use of 
tangible property that is not physically injured.”155  The first loss 
of use results from some physical injury and therefore requires 
some physical alteration, as the court concluded in Capstone 
Building Corp. 
However, the second loss of use does not result from physical 
injury and is therefore not contingent on some kind of physical 
alteration.  This second loss of use coverage can be thought to 
cover any loss of use of property that results from the property 
being defective at its inception.  This scenario does not presup-
pose that the owner had been using the property before defective 
subcontractor work rendered the property unusable by way of 
physical injury.  Instead, the owner had expected the property to 
be usable and the property was unusable because of some defect, 
such as the defective installation of some part before the property 
was put into use.  In other words, the defective work itself is the 
coverable property damage.  Therefore, if the property owner comes 
after the insured for the costs they incurred repairing or re-
placing the defective work, or for the loss of income they incurred 
waiting for the defective work to be repaired or replaced, the loss 
 
154 Li, supra note 45, at 180–81. 
155 Coverage Form (2013), supra note 16, at 565; see also supra Section I.A. 
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of use coverage is intended to indemnify the insured for that 
liability. 
Like the issue of whether faulty work can be considered an 
“occurrence,” whether the faulty work itself can be considered 
“property damage” is a threshold for initial coverage that can be 
limited by the business risk exclusions.156  Therefore, nothing 
precludes the New York Court of Appeals from interpreting 
“property damage” to encompass the defective work itself and 
limiting coverage for such damages under the business risk 
exclusions.  Importantly, this would still retain coverage for the 
cost of repairing and replacing defective work itself when the 
work was done by a subcontractor.  
Such a holding would better comport with the doctrines of 
insurance policy interpretation.  First, to the extent that the 
“property damage” language is ambiguous, it should be construed 
in favor of the insured under the doctrine of contra proferentum.  
Second, if a contractor expects to be indemnified for faulty work 
caused by a contractor because such faulty work is truly acciden-
tal, it makes sense that they would expect to be indemnified for 
the cost of repairing and replacing the faulty work, which is no 
less a part of the accident.157  Therefore, the reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine supports finding that the cost of repairing and 
replacing the faulty work itself is covered under the policy.  
Third, reading the policy as a whole, the cost of repairing and 
replacing the faulty work itself is a matter of initial coverage so 
long as the damages were not expected or intended; therefore, it 
should only be excluded if the business risk exclusions so provide. 
CONCLUSION 
The New York Court of Appeals should hold that faulty work 
is an “occurrence” under standard form CGL policies.  Unlike the 
 
156 See French, supra note 9, at 105. 
157 See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 885 (Fla. 2007) (“[W]e 
reject a definition of ‘occurrence’ that renders damage to the insured’s own work as a 
result of a subcontractor’s faulty workmanship expected, but renders damage to 
property of a third party caused by the same faulty workmanship unexpected.”); see 
also French, supra note 9, at 134 (“In sum, the courts holding defective work itself 
cannot be viewed as property damage have not offered a satisfying explanation why 
non-defective work that has been damaged and needs to be repaired or replaced be-
cause of defective workmanship constitutes property damage but the defective work 
itself that also needs to be repaired or replaced does not constitute property damage. 
In both instances, the property is unusable or damaged in its current state.”). 
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Supreme Court of Ohio, the New York Court of Appeals is not 
bound by past precedent to preclude liability for damages caused 
by faulty work from coverage under standard form CGL policies.  
As to the scope of coverage, the New York Court of Appeals 
should construe the term “accident” as wholly subjective and find 
that faulty work is an occurrence so long as it is not expected or 
intended from the standpoint of the insured.  The Court should 
then conclude that the business risk exclusions limit this broader 
form of initial coverage for “occurrences,” and that the “Your 
Work” exclusion in particular limits such coverage for damages to 
the insured’s own work caused by faulty work unless that faulty 
work was performed by a subcontractor.  Finally, the Court 
should conclude that the cost of repairing and replacing the 
faulty work itself falls within the definition of “property damage” 
under standard form CGL policies.  Like the business risk exclu-
sions, the Court should make clear that insurers and policy 
holders are free to negotiate an exclusion that limits coverage for 
the cost of repairing and replacing the faulty work itself, whether 
or not it causes damage to other property, but that such damages 
are not precluded from initial coverage under the policy.  
 
